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According to Lynne Baker, there are three main arguments for the ‘standard view’: an
argument from metaphysics, an argument from science, and an argument from causal
explanation - the last of these (the argument that mental states can have causal powers only
if they are brain states) perhaps being the most important. This list, however, is incomplete
since it leaves out what I regard to be the most effective argument for the ‘standard view’-
the argument from the implausibility of ‘downward causation’. Put in a nutshell, this
argument runs like this: If mental properties are causally efficacious and if they are not
realized by neurophysiological or other physical properties of persons then there are
neurophysiological (chemical, physical) events that cannot be accounted for by
neurophysiology (chemistry, physics), i.e. then there are ‘natural’ effects that do not have
‘natural’ causes. Since this is very implausible and since mental properties seem to be
causally efficacious, it seems to be very implausible to assume that mental properties are
not realized by neurophysiological or other physical properties of persons.
1   Baker on the Arguments for the Standard View
In her recent book Explaining Attitudes, Lynne Baker pursues two main goals.
On the one hand, she tries to undermine what she thinks to be the three main
arguments for the Standard View, the view that mental states are, or at least
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are constituted by, brain states. On the other hand, she develops an alternative
to the Standard View – a view she calls Practical Realism. In this paper, I
shall confine myself to the first part of her endeavor, arguing that Lynne
Baker has ignored what to my mind is the most important argument in favor
of the Standard View. This argument could be called the ‘argument from the
implausibility of downward causation’.1 I shall start, however, by paying a
short tribute to the three arguments for the Standard View that Baker
addresses.2
The first, the argument from metaphysics rests on the fundamental premise
that mental states are internal states. If we think of a person in the Cartesian
way as composed of a soul and a body, this premise implies that mental states
are either internal states of the soul, as Descartes thought, or internal states of
the body. Hence, if we deny the existence of Cartesian souls, we have to
conclude that mental states are internal states of the body. And since the organ
on which our whole mental life depends is the brain, this seems to amount to
the claim that mental states are brain states. The first argument, thus, can be
summarized like this:
Argument from metaphysics
(1)  Mental states are internal states.
(2)  Therefore: Mental states are internal states of the soul or internal states
of the body.
(3)  There are no Cartesian souls.
(4)  Therefore: Mental states are internal states of the body.
(5)  Therefore: Mental states are brain states.
The second argument, the argument from science, derives its force from
recent research in cognitive science. Some people say that cognitive science
has been very successful in explaining the cognitive capacities of human
beings and other higher animals on the basis of the assumption that the brain
works like a computer, i.e., that these capacities are grounded in certain
processes of symbol manipulation which, though abstract in nature, have to be
implemented in the brain in order to be effective. In the same vein it has been
argued that having a certain belief comes down to having a certain mental
representation tokened which is processed in a specific way. And
representations, too, must be realized by brain states to fulfill the role they are
                                          
1 This argument, of course, is not new. It has been forcefully put forward especially by J.
Kim. Cf. e.g. Kim (1992).
2 This tribute is not just a report of what Baker writes in her book, but rather an attempt to
work out what to my mind forms the core of her arguments.
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supposed to have. Therefore, according to these cognitive scientists, beliefs
must be brain states.
There has recently been much criticism of such lines of argument. The
critics of the computer metaphor, however, tend to place an even greater
emphasis on the role the brain plays in cognition. They hold that it is not
abstract algorithms, but concrete brain structures (neural networks, or what
have you) that are responsible for cognitive behavior and cognitive capacities.
Whatever else they criticize, these critics, therefore, do not take issue with the
claim that beliefs and other intentional states have to be brain states if they are
real at all. Hence, there are two versions of the argument from science:
Argument from science (1)
(1)  Cognitive capacities are grounded in certain processes of symbol
manipulation which, though abstract in nature, have to be implemented
in the brain to be effective.
(2)  Intentional states can play a role in this system of information processing
only if they consist in having certain representations tokened which are
processed in a specific way.
(3)  These representations must be realized by concrete brain states in order
to be able to do what they are assumed to do.
(4)  Therefore: Mental states are brain states.
Argument from science (2)
(1)  Cognitive capacities are not grounded in abstract algorithms, but in
concrete states and processes in the brain (neural networks, etc.).
(2)  Intentional states can play a role in the production of cognitive behavior
only if they are part of this system of brain states.
(3)  Therefore: Mental states are brain states.
Whatever approach we prefer, science seems to tell us that intentional states
must be brain states.
The last argument addressed by Baker is the argument from causal expla-
nation. There are only few epiphenomenalists around these days. Most
philosophers agree that mental states make a difference. People who believe
that it will rain tomorrow behave differently from people who believe that the
sun will shine. And people suffering from severe headaches behave
differently from people who feel relaxed after having taken a soothing bath.
The behavior of people, therefore, can often be causally explained by
reference to their mental states. And this, in turn, implies that the mental
states of persons indeed figure among the causes of their behavior. On the
other hand, we know that physical events must have physical causes and that
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our behavior is, in the end, caused by what is going on in our brains. Mental
states, therefore, can be among the causes of our behavior only if they are
states of our brains. That is, unless mental states are brain states they cannot
be causally relevant to our actions. Put in a nutshell, the argument from
causal explanation, thus, proceeds like this:
Argument from causal explanation
(1)  The mental states of a person are causally relevant for his/her behavior.
(2)  The mental states of a person cannot be causally relevant for his/her
behavior unless they are brain states.
(3)  Therefore: Mental states are brain states.
I am not going to analyze these three arguments in detail, nor am I going to
examine Baker’s comments on these arguments though this, I think, would be
very rewarding indeed. In what follows, I shall rather sketch a fourth
argument that, although it is – in a way – related to the argument from causal
explanation, enables us to look at the problem of the causal relevance of
mental states from a different angle.
Before taking up my argument, I would like to stress two points in which
Baker’s and my views concur. Let me stress that I wholeheartedly agree with
Baker that there is not the slightest reason to believe that mental states are
brain states if brain states are construed as “spatially and temporally locatable
inside a spatiotemporal entity like an organism” (Baker, 1995: 14). In my
view, it would be pure nonsense to assume that internal states have the
ontological status of physical particulars which are part of other physical
particulars. Believing something, desiring something, fearing something and
all other mental states no doubt have the ontological status of properties. This
classification marks the second point on which Baker and I are in full
agreement. However, I do not see why proponents of the Standard View
should be committed to denying this or why they should be committed to the
view that mental states are brain states in the sense mentioned. Think, for
example, of Fodor’s Representational Theory of Mind. Fodor is not claiming
that a belief is, in the end, nothing but a mental representation, i.e. a “spatially
and temporally locatable” state of the brain. What he does claim is this: A
belief is, in the end, a relational property of an organism, a property the
organism has if it stands in a certain relation to a certain mental
representation. This brings me to a first point of disagreement – the question
of what exactly it is that proponents of the Standard View claim.
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2    What the Standard View Really Amounts to
To my mind, the formula “Mental states are brain states”3 simply is far too
vague to be a good candidate for an adequate answer to this question. But
what more precise formula would be better suited to this purpose? If we keep
in mind what e.g. proponents of Logical Behaviorism or the Identity Theory
did in fact say and if we also bear in mind that what is being asked for is an
account of mental properties, perhaps the following formula would do a better
job: “Mental properties are either identical with or reducible to physical
properties”. Indeed, this is my preferred reading of what the Standard View
comprises. But even this formula is still too vague – at least as long as we do
not have a more precise idea of what ‘identical with’ and ‘reducible to’ could
mean in this context. I would, therefore, like to start with an answer to this
last question.4
In my view, the most sophisticated account of the concepts of identity and
reducibility rests on a distinction which was first drawn by C.D. Broad some
seventy years ago, the distinction between mechanically explainable and
emergent properties.5 Broad developed this distinction in the context of the
debate concerning the problem of Vitalism. With regard to this problem, two
factions opposed each other: the Mechanists, who claimed that the properties
characteristic of living organisms (metabolism, perception, goal-directed
behavior, procreation, morphogenesis) could be explained mechanically in the
same way in which the behavior of a clock can be explained by the properties
and the arrangement of its cogs, springs and weights, and the Vitalists, who
held the contrary view, namely that an explanation as envisaged by the
mechanists was impossible and that one had to postulate a special substance
in order to explain life – an entelechy or an élan vital. In his theory of
emergent properties Broad attempted to create room for a third position
mediating between these two extremes.
Broad’s first step was to point out that the problem of Vitalism is only a
special case of a much more general problem – the problem of how the
macro-properties of a complex system are related to its micro-structure, i.e.,
of how the macro-properties are related to the properties of the parts which
make up the system and their arrangement. With regard to this relation there
is the possibility (which amounts to a vitalistic position) that a macro-property
F of a system cannot be explained by means of its micro-structure, but only by
postulating an additional substance. However, if we disregard this possibility,
                                          
3 Cf., e.g., Baker (1995, pp. 6-7); and also Baker’s contribution to this volume.
4 For the following see also Beckermann (1992a; 1992b; 1996; 1997a; 1997b).
5 Cf. especially Broad 1925.
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we are not left with one further possibility (mechanism), but – Broad argues –
with two: the property F can be mechanically explainable, but it can also be
emergent. Broad explains the difference between these two positions as
follows:
Put in abstract terms the emergent theory asserts that there are certain wholes,
composed (say) of constituents A, B, and C in a relation R to each other; that all
wholes composed of constituents of the same kind as A, B, and C in relations of the
same kind as R have certain characteristic properties; that A, B, and C are capable of
occurring in other kinds of complex where the relation is not of the same kind as R;
and that the characteristic properties of the whole R(A, B, C) cannot, even in theory,
be deduced from the most complete knowledge of the properties of A, B, and C in
isolation or in other wholes which are not of the form R(A, B, C). The mechanistic
theory rejects the last clause of this assertion. (Broad 1925: 61)
Broad thus stresses two points:
1.  Both mechanically explainable and emergent properties depend
nomologically on corresponding micro-structures. That is to say, if a
system S with the micro-structure [C1, ..., Cn; R]6 possesses a macro-
property F, the sentence “For all x: if x has the micro-structure [C1, ..., Cn;
R], then x possesses the macro-property F” is a true law of nature,
regardless of whether F is mechanically explainable or emergent.
2.  Mechanically explainable properties differ from emergent properties in that
the former can, at least in principle, be deduced “from the most complete
knowledge of the properties of [the components C1, ..., Cn] in isolation or
in other wholes” while this cannot be done for the latter.
Thus, emergent properties are characterized by two features: (a) Like
mechanically explainable properties they depend on corresponding micro-
structural properties; but (b) in contrast to mechanically explainable
properties they cannot even in principle be deduced “from the most complete
knowledge of the properties of [the components C1, ..., Cn] in isolation or in
other wholes”.
I think that this yields a very illuminating first step towards drawing the
distinction in question. But why does Broad use the complicated clause “from
the most complete knowledge of the properties of [the components C1, ..., Cn]
in isolation or in other wholes”? And what does he mean by saying that
                                          
6 “System S has the micro-structure [C1, ..., Cn; R]” is a shorthand for “S consists of the
parts C1, ..., Cn which stand in the (spatial) relation R to each other”.
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certain properties of a system can be “deduced” from the complete knowledge
of the properties of its parts while others cannot?
With regard to the first question, what Broad seems to have had in mind is
precisely what Hempel and Oppenheim some twenty years after the first
publication of The Mind and Its Place in Nature phrased thus:
If a characteristic of a whole is counted as emergent simply if its occurrence cannot be
inferred from a knowledge of all the properties of its parts, then, as Grelling has
pointed out, no whole can have any emergent characteristics. Thus ! the properties
of hydrogen include that of forming, if suitably combined with oxygen, a compound
which is liquid, transparent, etc. Hence the liquidity, transparency, etc. of water can
be inferred from certain properties of its chemical constituents. (Hempel/Oppenheim
1948: 260)
In order to avoid rendering the concept of emergence vacuous, inferences
of this kind must be blocked. Broad’s formula serves precisely this purpose,
since it is obviously designed to guarantee that we cannot have recourse to
properties like those mentioned by Hempel and Oppenheim when we attempt
to deduce a macro-property F of a complex system from the properties of its
parts and their structure. However, the question remains as to whether this
purpose could have been accomplished with a simpler and more lucid
formulation. This much seems clear: It is crucial that in our attempts to
deduce some macro-property F of a complex object from the properties of its
parts and their structural relations, we are not allowed to use ‘ad hoc’-
properties such as the property that certain components, if arranged in a
specific way, form a complex object which has the property F. The question,
therefore, is how we can guarantee this without at the same time excluding
properties which we may legitimately refer to in such an attempt.
It may be possible to find an answer to this question if we consider which
laws we may use in deductions of this type. For here we encounter another
possible source of trivializing the concept of emergence. If we could utilize
the law mentioned above, i.e. the law “For all x: if x has the micro-structure
[C1, ..., Cn; R], then x possesses the macro-property F”, there would not be
any emergent properties, either. After all, Hempel and Oppenheim could have
formulated their point thus:
It is a true law of nature that, if suitably combined with oxygen, hydrogen forms a
compound which is liquid, transparent, etc. Hence the liquidity, transparency, etc. of
water can be derived by means of the laws of nature.
Broad, thus, must rule out recourse to laws of this type as well. That he,
indeed, sought to do so can be seen from the following passage discussing the
properties of clocks.
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We know perfectly well that the behaviour of a clock can be deduced from the
particular arrangement of springs, wheels, pendulum, etc., in it, and from general
laws of mechanics and physics which apply just as much to material systems which
are not clocks. (Broad 1925: 60 – italics mine)
Obviously, Broad holds that if we attempt to deduce some macro-property
F of a complex object from the properties and arrangement of its parts, we
may only use general laws which are valid for the parts of a complex system
independent of the specific configurations of these parts. Hence, the most
straightforward answer to the question “which properties of a system’s parts
may we refer to in such a deduction?” is apparently this: “to those properties
which are mentioned in these general laws of nature.” I would therefore like
to suggest that we replace Broad’s clause with the formula “if F can be
deduced by means of the general laws of nature which are true of the
components C1, ..., Cn from the properties of the components mentioned in
these laws.”7
Even after this point has been clarified, the question remains what Broad
meant with ‘deduction’ in this context. Broad himself does not offer any
precise answer. However, it may be possible to reconstruct the missing
answer with a little additional consideration. Properties are normally
characterized by a set of features:
– something has the property of being a bachelor if it is a man and unmarried.
– something has the property of being magnetic if it attracts iron filings, if it
induces electricity in circular conductors and if it shows all the other
characteristics which are typical for being magnetic.
– something has a temperature of 300 K if upon touch it induces a certain
sensation of warmth, if the mercury column of a thermometer with which it
has been thermally balanced reaches the mark 26.85 C, and if it has all the
other causes and effects which are characteristic of this temperature.
 If we wish to deduce the macro-property F of a system from the system’s
microstructure, it, therefore, is crucial that we succeed in showing that it
follows from the general laws of nature that each system which has this
microstructure also possesses all features which are characteristic of F. On the
whole, I take it that Broad’s considerations concerning the distinction
                                          
7 In the last consequence, this improved version of Broad’s formula renders superfluous
any reference to admissible properties; if we specify which laws can figure in the
derivations in question, we have implicitly determined which properties may play a role
in the derivations mentioned.
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between mechanically explainable and emergent properties can best be
summarized in the following two definitions:
 (ME) A macro-property F of a complex system S with the micro-structure
[C1, ..., Cn; R] is mechanically explainable if and only if the following
is true:
 (a) The statement “For all x: if x has the micro-structure [C1, ..., Cn;
R] then x has the macro-property F” is a true law of nature, and
 (b) it follows from the general laws of nature applying to the
components C1, ..., Cn that S possesses all features which are
characteristic of the property F.
 (E) A macro-property F of a complex system S with the micro-structure
[C1, ..., Cn; R] is emergent if and only if the following is true:
 (a) on the one hand the statement “For all x: if x has the micro-
structure [C1, ..., Cn; R] then x has the macro-property F” is a true
law of nature, on the other hand, however,
 (b) it does not follow from the general laws of nature applying to the
components C1, ..., Cn that S possesses all features which are
characteristic of the property F.
 A great merit of these two definitions resides in the fact that Broad’s
distinction between mechanically explainable and emergent properties far
better captures the intuitive difference between reducible properties and
properties that cannot be reduced to more fundamental properties than all
other accounts have been able to, including the ones offered by Logical
Behaviorism and the Identity Theory. That is to say, from the definition (ME)
we can immediately derive a definition of the concepts of reducibility or
realization that is much more in accord with our intuitive preconceptions than
any other definition proposed.
 (R) A macro-property F of a system S is at t reducible to a micro-structure
[C1, ..., Cn; R] (is at t realized by a micro-structure [C1, ..., Cn; R]) if and
only if S at t has the micro-structure [C1, ..., Cn; R]) and if it follows from
the general laws of nature applying to the components C1, ..., Cn that S at
t possesses all features which are characteristic of the property F.
 This definition may also serve as a starting point for a better understanding
of what ‘identity’ can mean in this context. For that F is identical with a
certain micro-structure [C1, ..., Cn; R] seems to amount to no more than that
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 F is, for whatever reasons, always realized by the same micro-structure [C1,
..., Cn; R]. A simple and adequate definition of ‘identity’, thus, can be given in
this way:
 (I) A macro-property F is ‘identical’ to a certain micro-structure [C1, ..., Cn;
R] if and only if any object x has F if and only if x has the micro-
structure [C1, ..., Cn; R] and if it follows from the general laws of nature
applying to the components C1, ..., Cn that x, if it has the micro-structure
[C1, ..., Cn; R], possesses all features which are characteristic of the
property F.8
 Perhaps an example may help us to understand better what these definitions
– and especially definition (R) – amount to. Take for instance the property of
being liquid. Presumably everyone would agree that the liquidity of water is
reducible to its micro-structure. But why is this? In general, liquids differ
from gases in that their volume is (almost) incompressible. They differ from
solids in that their shape is changeable and moulds itself to the receptacle
holding them. This is the case because in liquids – as opposed to gases – the
molecules are as tightly packed as possible. They cannot get any closer to
each other (or rather, they can do so only under very great pressure), because
the repulsive forces between the molecules do not permit this. On the other
hand, the molecules of liquids can move relative to each other, they can – so
to speak – roll over each other freely, while the molecules of solids are
prevented from such motion by the forces which hold them in their relative
positions. Therefore, the molecules of solids can only move together: the
whole object moves, while the relative position of its molecules remains the
same, thereby keeping the object’s form constant. Now, almost all scientists
would agree that the forces which water molecules exercise on each other
under certain conditions follow from the natural laws that are generally true of
them. Hence, it also follows from these natural laws that the repulsive forces
between the molecules are such that they do not permit them to get any closer
to each other, and that the attractive forces are great enough to minimize the
distance between the molecules, but not so great as to fix them in their
relative positions.
 Even this simple example demonstrates clearly that definition (R)
encounters a problem concerning interlevel connections. For, obviously, from
the general laws of nature applying to the components of a system it only
follows how these components behave under certain conditions. Thus, the
                                          
 8 The term ‘identical’ here is put in scare-quotes because ‘identity’ in the sense of
definition (I) indeed is very different from the strict identity of logic.
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question remains of how we can infer from the properties of a system’s
components which properties the system possesses as a whole. Broad does not
offer an answer to this question, and perhaps no general answer can be given.
Nevertheless, if we consider concrete examples, it can be seen how this
problem may be solved in individual cases. In the example just cited, for
instance, the inference from the behavior of the system’s components to the
behavior of the system as a whole is based on a simple principle: If we know
which forces the molecules of an object exert on each other, we also know
how easily these molecules can move relative to each other. And if we know
the latter, we also know whether the object is solid or liquid. Another
principle which is very important in a range of similar cases is this: If we
know how all constituent parts of an object move, we also know how the
whole object moves. This principle is applied in the following case.
 Among the characteristic features of the property of being magnetic counts
the fact that magnetic objects attract iron filings in their proximity. Does this
follow from the general laws applying to the parts of magnetic objects?
Consider, for instance, a permanent magnet, i.e. a piece of iron which is
permanently magnetic. A permanent magnet, as physics informs us, consists
of many tiny elementary magnets, which all point in the same direction. The
iron filings in its proximity also consist of small elementary magnets, albeit
unordered ones. From the general laws which apply to elementary magnets it
follows: If the elementary magnets in some piece of iron are directionally
aligned, they generate a relatively strong magnetic field around this piece.
This magnetic field causes the – previously unordered – elementary magnets
in the iron filings to align themselves in such a way that they point towards
the permanent magnet with that pole which is opposed to the closest pole of
the permanent magnet. This has the following consequence: on all elementary
magnets in the iron filings a force is exerted in the same direction, namely the
direction towards the permanent magnet. Since this force is not counteracted
by any other force, the elementary magnets begin to move in that direction.
And if all constituent parts of an object move in a certain direction, the object
itself also moves in that direction.
 The principles which have so far been illustrated by just two examples do
not allow us to deal with all cases, but they may give an impression of how
the problem of interlevel connections associated with the definitions (R) and
(I) may be solved in individual cases.9
                                          
 9 In Beckermann (1992b) the author discusses an example in which the color of a liquid is
explained by the chemical structure of the liquid. Obviously, in this example the
following principle is used: If we know photons of which wavelength are absorbed by
the molecules of a liquid, we also know which color that liquid has.
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3    The Real Reason for the Standard View
 Having thus elaborated the main thesis of the Standard View, viz. the claim
that mental properties are either identical with, or reducible to, physical
properties, we can proceed to the question of what arguments can be offered
to establish the truth of this thesis. Well, I do not think that the thesis can be
given an a priori proof. But there are some arguments which indeed lend it a
high prima facie plausibility. As already mentioned, in what follows I shall
concentrate on one of these arguments, since I believe that it supports the
Standard View in a very strong way.
 In order to understand the argument, it may be reasonable to begin by
asking what would follow if the Standard View was false. On the basis of the
definitions (R) and (I), there is a plain answer to this question: If the Standard
View were false, mental properties would at least be emergent, i.e., they
would be properties that, even in principle, could not be deduced from the
properties of the parts of the organisms that are their bearers. This is why we
should try and be as clear as possible about what it would mean if mental
properties were emergent, i.e. what it would mean to claim that at least some
macro-properties of physical systems are not realized by their micro-
structures. Let us ask, for example, what would be the case if it turned out that
the property of being magnetic was an emergent property.
 We have already seen that the property of being magnetic is (at least in
part) characterized by the fact that magnetic things behave in a particular way:
– Magnetic objects attract iron filings in their proximity;
– the needle of a compass near a magnetic object tends to point in its
direction;
– magnetic objects induce an electrical current in coils which they pass
through;
– magnetic objects tend to magnetize non magnetic pieces of iron in their
vicinity; etc.
Being magnetic, thus, makes a difference especially to the behavior of certain
objects in the neighborhood of magnetic things. These behavioral differences,
however, do not only concern these objects themselves but also their parts. If
a magnetic object induces electrical current in a coil which it passes through,
for example, this is so because the magnetic object causes the electrons in the
coil to behave differently. And even in the case where a magnetic object
causes a nearby compass needle to point in its direction, this can happen only
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in virtue of the atoms which the needle consists of being caused to move in a
specific way.
Now, think of an arbitrary magnetic object S. If being magnetic is
emergent, then, by definition, S’s being magnetic is not realized by its micro-
structure. And that, in turn, implies that it does not follow from the general
laws of nature applying to the parts of S that S (and the objects in S’s
neighborhood) behave the way they actually do. In other words, if being
magnetic is emergent (a) the fact that electrical current is induced in a coil
which S passes through cannot be explained by the general laws of nature
applying to the parts of S. And, by the same token, if being magnetic is
emergent (b) the fact that a nearby compass needle moves to point in S’s
direction cannot be accounted for by these same laws. But that is not yet the
whole story. What is even more important is this: Since a flow of current
consists of certain movements of the electrons in the coil and since the
movement of the compass needle occurs in virtue of certain movements of the
atoms which make up this needle, it follows from (a) and (b) that, if being
magnetic is emergent, not even the movements of the electrons in the coil and
the movements of the atoms which the compass needle consists of can be
explained by the general laws of nature applying to the parts of S, i.e.
applying to the atoms which make up S.
The irritating consequence, then, is this: if being magnetic is emergent,
then nuclear physics is incomplete in a disturbing way. Each time the
movements of certain atoms are caused by a certain object’s being magnetic,
these movements cannot be accounted for by the relevant general laws of this
part of science. Or, to put it another way, since movements are always caused
by corresponding forces, the emergent character of being magnetic would
imply that atoms are sometimes moved by forces the existence of which
cannot be derived from the general laws of nuclear physics.
And this, of course, can be generalized. Each emergent property which is at
least in part characterized by the fact that objects having this property move
in a certain way leads to a gap in nuclear physics, i.e. leads to the assumption
that atoms are sometimes moved by forces that cannot be explained by means
of the general laws of this science. The only proviso that should be added is
perhaps that this conclusion can be drawn only if the macro-behavior
characteristic of the emergent property in question can take place only if the
atoms which the corresponding macro-systems consist of themselves move in
specific ways.
Some might think, however, that there is a way to bypass this consequence.
Broad himself admitted that emergent properties are nomologically dependent
on micro-structural properties. That is, according to Broad’s account, for each
emergent macro-property F there exists a set of micro-structures M such that
the following holds:
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1. A system x can possess F only if it has one of the micro-structures
belonging to M.
2. For each member Mi of M: if x has Mi, then x has F.
Even if being magnetic is emergent, our system S, therefore, can have this
property only if it has one of the corresponding micro-structures, i.e., if it
consists of certain atoms arranged in a specific manner R. In order to explain
the movement of the electrons in the coil or the movement of the atoms of the
compass needle we thus need not leave the level of atoms. For, instead of
accounting for these movements by reference to S’s being magnetic, we can
explain these movements just as well by tracing them back to the fact that the
atoms S consists of are arranged in the manner R. Thus, in contrast to what
has been claimed so far, all effects of emergent properties can be accounted
for at the level of atoms.
This objection, however, would miss a decisive point. For the most
intriguing upshot of the argument is not that the existence of emergent
properties would imply the existence of effects at the atomic level that cannot
be explained at this very level, but that the existence of emergent properties
would imply the existence of effects at the atomic level that cannot be
accounted for by the general laws of nuclear physics, but only by what might
be called special laws, i.e. laws that tell us nothing but that certain
(unexpected) effects E1, ..., Em occur if particles of kind C1, ..., Cn are
arranged in the manner R. According to Broad’s account of emergent
properties, the movement of the electrons in the coil or the movement of the
atoms of the compass needle can, of course, be explained by the fact that S
consists of certain atoms arranged in a certain manner. But if being magnetic
is indeed emergent, the law which tells us that atoms of this kind, arranged in
this way, cause these kind of movements itself cannot in any way be derived
from the laws that generally hold for particles of this kind. For if it could, it
would follow from these general laws that objects that consist of atoms of this
kind arranged in this way would have all features that are characteristic of
being magnetic. And this in turn would imply that being magnetic is not
emergent.
Thus, a better way to make the essential point of the argument would be to
say that the existence of emergent properties would destroy the homogeneity
of nuclear physics. It would make nuclear physics a science with some
general laws and a whole bunch of exceptions, i.e., it would make physics
what may justly be called a weird science. To take a simple example, in
classical mechanics, the law of gravitation
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is thought to hold quite generally for all masses m1 and m2 and all distances r.
It would strike us as very strange if it turned out that there were some masses
and distances for which the force exerted on the two bodies would not
conform to this law. Say, if it turned out that for m1=1 and m2=10 and r=1 the
force exerted would amount to 5 instead of 10 N. Or, to take another example,
we are all fairly convinced that the principle of the parallelogram of forces
applies to all bodies and all forces whatsoever. Thus again, it would be very
strange indeed if it turned out that for certain pairs of forces F1 and F2 the
resulting force did not equal the vector sum of F1 and F2.
The assumption that there are emergent properties, however, would yield
exactly this result. It would imply that the general laws of physics have quite a
number of exceptions. For emergent properties, at least if they are in part
characterized by the fact that objects having this property move in a certain
way, cause the parts of the systems whose properties they are to move in ways
that cannot be accounted for by the general laws of the relevant sciences.
Each such case, therefore, constitutes an exception to these laws; which is
why we need a special law to account for it.
Returning to the Standard View, we only have to apply the result of the
foregoing considerations. For it is one of Baker’s main claims that mental
properties make a difference, that more often than not we are able to causally
explain the behavior of persons by reference to their intentional attitudes. And
there can be no doubt that when I raise my arm because I want to call
someone’s attention this can happen only if the muscles, cells and atoms
which make up my arm move in a certain way. Thus, if the Standard View is
false, i.e. if at least some mental properties are emergent, then there are
movements of the muscles, cells and atoms which make up the limbs of
persons that cannot be explained by the general laws of neurophysiology,
biochemistry or physics. The falseness of the Standard View, thus, would
imply that all these sciences are weird sciences in the sense explained.
Just to make this quite plain, I am not maintaining that this is impossible,
that there is an a priori proof that at least physics is not a weird science.
(Empirical research may show that indeed it is.) But I do think that, for all we
know, this is a highly implausible idea. Therefore, I do claim, that there is a
high prima facie plausibility to the position that the Standard View is true.
Perhaps Baker would answer that only someone who is already in the grip
of what she calls ‘methodological physicalism’ is prone to think so.
The methodological physicalist starts with a theoretical picture based on a
philosophical idea of fundamental physics. He looks to see what general principles –
like the closure of the physical and strong supervenience – that picture implies. Then,
for any putative kind of phenomena, he checks to see how it fits the picture. If he
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cannot imagine how some putative phenomena fit the microphysical world, then it is
deemed unsuited for “serious science”. And according to the methodological
physicalist, nothing unsuited for serious science can play an ineliminable role in a
complete description and explanation of all phenomena. (This volume, p. 23f.#)
But this is not quite the truth. The ‘argument from the implausibility of
downward causation’ does not rest on “a theoretical picture based on a
philosophical idea of fundamental physics”. Just like the argument against the
Standard View put forward in Baker’s contribution to this volume, it rather
rests on “an empirical conjecture about the future of neuroscience” (this
volume, p. 19 or, in the end, about the future physics. The argument does not
run: According to my theoretical picture, complete physics will have such and
such features; therefore downward causation is impossible; therefore there are
no emergent properties. Instead its main premise is empirical: For all we
know, it seems plausible to assume that within complete physics all
microphysical phenomena will be explainable by means of a certain set of
fundamental laws.
Thus, in the end there seems to be a clash of empirical conjectures
concerning the future of certain sciences. Baker thinks that “neuroscientists in
the long run will not be able to identify particular neural tokens as tokens of
the belief that p (for any belief that p)” (this volume, p. 8#). And she argues
that this, together with her other arguments, shows that the Standard View is
false. Defenders of the ‘argument from the implausibility of downward
causation’ on the other hand think that within complete physics all
microphysical phenomena will be explainable by means of a certain set of
fundamental laws. And they argue that this implies that there are no emergent
properties, i.e., that the Standard View is true (if there are any mental
properties at all). Do we have to acknowledge a stalemate? Or is there any
means of resolving this difficulty?
There is. For, in my view, defenders of the Standard View are not
committed to the thesis that for each token of a mental state there is a
corresponding neural token to which it is identical or by which it is realized.10
Defenders of the Standard View only have to claim that mental properties are
not emergent. Whether, e.g., a certain belief is emergent or not, however, does
not depend on whether there is a corresponding neural token, but only on
whether it follows from the fundamental laws of nature that a person who is
made up of such and such cells arranged in such and such a manner possesses
all features which are characteristic of someone who has this belief. That is, if
a belief is realized at all it may well be realized not by a particular neural
                                          
10 The talk of ‘types’ and ‘tokens’ in this context has aptly been criticized in Andreas Kem-
merling (1997).
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state, but by the overall state of the person’s body. I am not sure whether
Baker would also claim that scientists in the long run will not be able to show
that a person who is made up of such and such cells arranged in such and such
a manner possesses all features which are characteristic of someone who has a
certain belief. Maybe she would. But I feel that such a claim would be hard to
substantiate.
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